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Abstract. This paper aims to identify and order the harms or losses which the law 
might compensate in actions for breach of privacy. Part I identifies three such harms: 
pecuniary loss, mental distress and breach of privacy per se. Part II comprises an 
ordering exercise which requires a theoretical detour in order to explain why the 
redress of these various heads of detriment answers to two different logics which 
ought not to be combined. This is because pecuniary loss and mental distress 
correspond to a ‘bipolar’ model of tort, where the wrong is contrasted with the 
ensuing losses: on that model, the abstract loss of privacy ought not to be 
compensated separately. Conversely, the compensation of the right-diminution itself 
entails switching to a ‘unipolar’ model, whereby wrong and loss collapse onto one 
another, rendering redundant the redress of harms flowing directly from it. The law of 
privacy shows itself to be a battlefield between these two analytical frameworks, 
where the temptation to combine the approaches is a constant one. Part III examines 
four consequences the choice of model has on (i) the privacy of juridical persons, (ii) 
that of non-sentient beings, (iii) the meaning of loss in privacy actions and (iv) the 
relationship between compensating and vindicating the right to privacy. 
 




This article has two aims, one narrow and relatively simple; the other wider and more 
ambitious. The narrow aim is to identify the various types of harm that the claimant 
can – at least potentially – seek redress for in an action for breach of privacy.1 This 
simply entails looking at the decisions that were handed down on that basis and 
examining what courts have said, tidying up the language to avoid unnecessary 
                                                 
* Reader in European Private Law, University of Edinburgh. A preliminary version of this paper was 
presented at a conference on ‘The Campbell Legacy: A Decade of “Misuse of Private Information”’, 
that was held at Newcastle Law School on 17 April 2015. Thanks are extended to Daithí Mac Síthigh 
for the invitation and to the participants, in particular Nicole Moreham and Hugh Tomlinson, for their 
helpful comments. A fuller version of the paper was also presented at the University of Otago and the 
Victoria University of Wellington on 16 and 21 July 2015, where again I benefited from the ensuing 
discussions. 
1 This article is not interested in non-monetary remedies, like injunctions. Within damages (money 
awards) it also ignores exemplary damages, to which courts have all but closed the door in privacy 
actions (Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20, [210]), 
and restitutionary (disgorgement) damages, which it has been argued should be allowed (Normann 
Witzleb, ‘Justifying Gain-based Remedies for Invasions of Privacy’ (2009) 29 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 325). Aggravated damages are regarded as a species of compensatory damages which do not 
raise separate issues. The focus of this paper is decidedly on compensatory damages. A difficulty, 
however, is that how far a money award can be described as compensatory for loss depends on how 
broadly the notion of loss is construed. When loss is defined in a narrower way, this will open up a gap 
which some have tried to fill by resorting to the concept of vindicatory damages (see below, 21). On 
the basis of the more extensive understanding that this paper defends, however, there is as will be seen 
no need for this separate response. However the word ‘redress’ is used as an umbrella term for both 
compensation and vindication so as not to beg the question that the non-punitive and non-restitutionary 
damages in privacy actions are necessarily compensatory. 
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duplicates. What will be argued is that they are of three sorts: pecuniary loss, mental 
distress and loss of privacy considered in itself. The broader ambition is to rationalise 
the way the law thinks about such harms, losses or injuries. This is much more 
difficult because it requires understanding the underpinning structures of tort law on 
which these various heads of damages are – implicitly – predicated. Here, the 
argument will be that the sorts of harm courts have claimed to compensate expose the 
wrong2 of breach of privacy as the main battlefield between two models of tort law, 
which carry two ways of understanding the relationship between wrong and loss: a 
dominant one, described as ‘bipolar’, which contrasts the wrong with the loss or 
losses that flow from it; and another – ‘unipolar’ – model which conflates the wrong 
and the loss, i.e. identifies the loss with the violation of the protected right. Distress 
and pecuniary loss, it will be argued, are tied to the former model, whereas loss of 
privacy is wedded to the latter; the important point is  that we ought not to combine 
them because they answer to two conflicting rationalities. 
 This broader point will require a general analysis of tort law, the significance 
of which is in no way restricted to actions for breach of privacy.3 But privacy4 actions 
are of particular interest in this respect because they constitute possibly the clearest 
battlefield between the two models; and the recent case of Gulati v MGN,5 now the 
leading judgment concerning quantum of damages in English privacy law (on which 
this article focuses), shows them coming to a head in an especially clear way. As will 
be explored in the final part, the choice between the two models has a number of 
implications for the shape of this fledging area of the law, in particular the (highly 
disputed) question of whether juridical persons have a right to privacy and the 
possibility of ‘vindicating’ the right to privacy, which itself relates to the 
understanding we have of loss (in the sense of the detriments the law seeks to 
compensate) in the context of privacy actions.  
 
I. Three Heads of Detriment 
 
1. A note on terminology 
We begin in this section by examining the various detriments that the claimant in a 
privacy action might have suffered and seek compensation (or more generally, 
redress) for. ‘Detriment’ is a convenient word to start with because it is not a term of 
art and usefully conveys the idea of worse-offness at its broadest; but it is not 
proposed to press it into service in any particular technical sense because, in an 
already crowded toolbox, it is in all but the most unusual circumstances ill-advised to 
introduce yet further competitors: what the law needs is for the meaning of key words 
to be stabilised (so that, in turn, concepts can be articulated with precision), not for 
writers to add to the confusion by putting forward additional terms.  
                                                 
2 The word is used here in the sense of civil wrong. Whether it is a tort stricto sensu has been disputed 
but now seems to have been settled authoritatively (and, to my mind, correctly) in the affirmative: see 
Google Inc v Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311, [2015] CP Rep 28, [43]: ‘if one puts aside the 
circumstances of its “birth”, there is nothing in the nature of the claim itself to suggest that the more 
natural classification of it as a tort is wrong’.  
3 In an English context ‘breach of privacy’ means misuse of private information, English law only 
recognizing at this stage the violation of one particular type of privacy, namely, informational privacy. 
Insofar as the arguments developed in this article are not tied to that species of invasions, it is however 
better to use the broader label. 
4 ‘Privacy’ is used here, and frequently through this article, as shorthand for ‘breach of privacy’: an 
incorrect but useful and now well-established shortcut.  
5 Gulati v MGN Ltd [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), unreported. 
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 The difficulty is that, naturally, none of the possible candidates – ‘loss’, 
‘harm’, ‘injury’, ‘damage’ and possibly others (e.g. ‘prejudice’) – have a stable 
meaning. ‘Damage’ has too much of an overtone of the sort of physical corruption we 
contemplate when we speak of ‘damage to property’ to be useful. ‘Injury’ is 
unsuitable in the present context for the very same reason that ordinarily makes it a 
convenient label for scholars, namely, its constant oscillation – and refusal to choose 
– between the wrong and the consequences of the wrong. There remain ‘loss’ and 
‘harm’. It seems fair to say both that ‘harm’ is the less cogently defined of the two 
(because it is the less technical one, ‘loss’ being the main term of art that lawyers 
have pressed into service) and also that it is wider, in the sense that there are many 
situations where it is easy to imagine lawyers being happy to use it but not to speak of 
‘loss’, whereas the opposite would not appear to be true. Situations of detriments 
referred to as ‘abstract’, ‘legal’ or ‘normative’ losses spring to mind, such as loss of 
autonomy, of use or of privacy considered in themselves: while (as the very labels 
suggest) some would be happy for the word ‘loss’ to be used – if perhaps always with 
a qualifier –, equally it is clear that many would take argument with such a ‘strained 
and artificial’6 use of the term. To avoid using question-begging terminology when 
examining issues which, as will be seen, largely hinge on how broadly the notion of 
‘loss’ is construed, the word ‘harm’ is being preferred in this paper, at least as a 
starting point. It will be used interchangeably with ‘loss’ in its broadest sense: that of 
any detriment, i.e. any actualisation of real-life events which make the claimant worse 
off than he would have been without the conduct complained of. 
  Against this background, an examination of the cases shows that there are 
three, and only three, types of harms that the law of privacy concerns itself with.7 
They are: (i) pecuniary loss, (ii) mental distress and (iii) the loss of privacy itself. The 
only complication is that the terminology used is unstable; but it should not be 
difficult to accept that they are distinct clusters exhausting the field and also that no 
further meaningful distinction can be made within these clusters. 
 
2. Pecuniary loss 
There is no particular significance attached to the above order; it is simply one of 
convenience. Pecuniary loss comes first because it is the most obvious type of loss 
generally: as has been rightly remarked, it lies at the heart of the concept of loss –8 to 
the point where, still today, the idea that loss that is not directly valuable in money is 
not ‘real’ or ‘proper’ loss never lies deep below the surface of the law. On the other 
hand, no-one would want to deny that such injuries to the pocket are loss (naturally 
there might be disputes as to whether they are wrongful losses, but this is an entirely 
distinct question).  
 It is therefore striking that, in the context of privacy claims, pecuniary loss – 
i.e. economic loss, whether direct or consequential – tends to be noticeably absent. It 
is rarely even pleaded, and it is questionable whether it has in fact ever been redressed 
using this cause of action. While proving negatives is always difficult, it is striking 
that the leading authority in the English-speaking world, Tugendhat and Christie’s 
The Law of Privacy and the Media, only references one privacy case under that 
heading – the Douglas v Hello! saga, where damages were awarded for ‘the expected 
                                                 
6 A phrase used by Lord Nicholls in Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268, 279. 
7 Naturally this does not mean that they will all be present in each case: indeed, if the argument in this 
paper is correct, they should never all co-exist.  
8 Andrew Tettenborn, ‘What is a Loss?’, in Jason Neyers, Erika Chamberlain and Stephen Pitel (eds), 
Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Hart 2007) 441, 443. 
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revenue which would have come from the editions carrying the authorized wedding 
exclusives as they were originally planned by the publisher’ –9 even though this case 
was not in fact an instance of economic loss consequential on breach of privacy.  
 The plaintiff couple in that case, Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones, 
sued ‘Hello!’ for publishing unauthorised photographs of their wedding in New York: 
a clear breach of their privacy which, given their celebrity status, also caused 
economic loss to a third party, ‘OK!,’ who had secured the exclusive right to publish a 
selection of approved photographs. As a result they sold fewer copies of their 
magazine than they would otherwise had, some of the public’s appetite for the event 
having already been satisfied by their competitor. ‘OK!’ consequently sued for 
damages alongside the celebrity couple. But in no sense was their economic loss, for 
which damages were ultimately awarded (the House of Lords reversing the decision 
of the Court of Appeal, which had itself overruled the trial judge) consequential upon 
a breach of privacy. For one thing, of course, any privacy right would have been the 
Douglases’, not the magazine’s. Besides, and more fundamentally, the fact that the 
published photographs concerned a private event was a mere happenstance; what 
mattered to the claimant magazine was that it was confidential information. That point 
was put with utmost clarity by Lord Hoffmann in the House of Lords, speaking for 
the majority on that point: 
 
It is … necessary to avoid being distracted by the concepts of privacy and 
personal information … [T]his appeal is not concerned with the protection of 
privacy. Whatever may have been the position of the Douglases … “OK!’s” 
claim is to protect commercially confidential information and nothing more. So 
your Lordships need not be concerned with Convention rights. “OK!” has no 
claim to privacy under article 8 nor can it make a claim which is parasitic upon 
the Douglases’ right to privacy. The fact that the information happens to have 
been about the personal life of the Douglases is irrelevant. It could have been 
information about anything that a newspaper was willing to pay for.10 
 
 If the economic loss was actionable, therefore, it was not qua consequential 
upon a breach of privacy but rather because it flowed from another wrong: either 
breach of confidence (the solution adopted by the House of Lords) or one of the twin 
economic torts of inducing breach of contract and causing loss by unlawful means 
(which were discussed but rejected by the Court). In other words, the same set of facts 
– the taking and publishing of the photographs – gave rise to more than one cause of 
action; and while the economic loss arose from the same facts as those which made 
out the action for breach of privacy, and subsequently to it, it was not in any sense 
consequential upon that wrong. Post hoc sed non propter hoc. 
 Nonetheless, it is very difficult to deny that economic loss could potentially 
arise in a privacy case – which would however seem to be necessarily consequential 
rather than direct – and that, if it did, it should and would be recoverable on the usual 
conditions. If nothing else, this could be because the privacy-infringing information is 
also defamatory of the claimant: 11  defamatory statements do by nature have a 
                                                 
9 Mark Warby, Nicole Moreham and Iain Christie (eds), Tugendhat and Christie’s The Law of Privacy 
and the Media (2nd ed, OUP 2011) §13.95. I am grateful to Dr Moreham for having allowed me 
advance access to the relevant sections of the as yet unpublished third edition, which remain 
unchanged.  
10 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, [118] (conjoined appeal with OBG 
Ltd v Allan and Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young). 
11 If it is both, suing in privacy would allow, for instance, to bypass the defence of truth. 
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tendency to cause economic losses, since they are liable to cause others to think less 
well of the claimant, and oftentimes these third parties will respond by modifying 
their behaviour in such a way that his pocket will suffer. This would amount to 
economic loss consequential upon the breach of privacy.12  
 
3. Mental distress  
The second type of harm that can be identified in breach of privacy actions is mental 
distress in the broadest sense of unpleasant emotions. It does not pose significant 
analytical difficulties: as long as one accepts that mental distress can at least 
potentially occur in privacy cases (which is self-evident) and that this detriment 
counts as a harm (which would also be fairly obvious on the basis of the definition 
sketched out above), then it is aptly described as one of the ‘harms of privacy’. Indeed 
privacy cases are dotted with references to such harms, from ‘distress’13 to ‘hurt’ or 
‘injured’ ‘feeling[s]’,14 to ‘pain’,15 ‘embarrassment’16 or ‘humiliation’.17 (The more 
interesting question in that context really is whether there is, or could be, any 
successful action in privacy in the absence of such harm, a point that is returned to 
below). 
 The only slightly difficult issue is that of labels. As can be seen, a variety of 
terms have been used by courts to describe what Peter Handford calls ‘unpleasant 
emotions’.18 Without going as far as suggesting that they are all interchangeable, 
which is clearly not the case, it is equally clear that courts do not have a particular 
taxonomy of such emotions in mind when they use the above terms, whether in 
isolation or in combination. Rather, congruent with ordinary language, they are 
pressed into service in an unsystematic way to approximate the underlying (and 
always complex) spectrum of human emotions at play. It does not seem that any 
injustice is being done to them if we say that all of the above labels boil down to an 
idea of emotional disturbance or upset. In turn, the term ‘mental distress’, which is 
both broad and commonly used, seems as good a term as any to operate as an 
umbrella category encompassing them all. (‘Mental harm’, ‘loss of happiness’, 
‘sentimental harm’ or ‘emotional harm’ would also be suitable labels, the main point 
being one of consistency.) The interest that is being considered here, through its 
various disruptions, is that in emotional tranquillity or wellbeing. Accordingly the 
focus is on the internal consequences of the wrong suffered on the mind on the 
claimant.  
 
4. Loss of privacy 
                                                 
12 Still, such a scenario would in a very real sense be a quasi-defamation action, i.e. it would be an 
action clothed in the appearances of a misuse of private information claim, but where the gist of the 
plaintiff’s grievance would be that it reflected detrimentally on him. Outside of these cases, i.e. in ‘pure 
privacy’ cases, it is actually difficult to imagine how economic loss could truly be said to be 
consequential on the informational misuse (as opposed to arising sequentially from the same set of 
facts). This cannot be pursued here but the point is worth noting. 
13 E.g. Gulati (n 5), [168]; Mosley (n 1), [216], [224]; Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 
AC 457, [33], [34]. 
14 E.g. Gulati (n 5), [169]; Mosley (n 1), [216]. 
15 E.g. Campbell (n 13), [33]. 
16 E.g. Mosley (n 1), [235]; Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB), [2014] 
EMLR 24, [196]; Campbell (n 13), [75]. 
17 E.g. Campbell (n 13), [75]. 
18 Peter Handford, Nicholas Mullany and Philip Mitchell (eds), Mullany and Handford’s Tort Liability 
for Psychiatric Damage (2nd edn, Lawbook Co 2006) 56-7. 
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The third type of harm that one encounters in privacy cases would be, perhaps 
tautologically, the injury to the claimant’s privacy itself: his ‘loss of privacy’ to use a 
phrase that is in common usage, even though many would probably want to deny that, 
in and by itself, it is in fact a loss (although it most certainly is a harm in the above 
sense of detriment). The best two judicial illustrations of loss of privacy being a 
compensable harm are probably to be found under the pen of Mann J in Gulati, when 
he wrote that damages in a privacy action ‘should compensate not merely for distress 
… but … also … for the loss of privacy … as such’,19 and that of Dingemans J in 
Weller, who considered that ‘damages for misuse of private information should 
compensate the [c]laimants for the misuse of their private information’,20 in other 
words, for the loss of (or injury to) their privacy itself.  
 Again, there are terminological difficulties. In particular, the right or interest 
of the claimant’s whose violation is characterised as the harm can be phrased in 
different ways and, besides loss of privacy, courts have also spoken of ‘loss of 
autonomy’. 21  ‘Autonomy’ (literally, the state of being a law unto oneself) is a 
complex and multifaceted concept but, in the present context, it seems clear that it is 
not meant to describe a different injury from the injury to privacy. Either the two 
words are used as synonyms, as in Gulati 22  or – a doctrinally more suitable 
interpretation to my mind – autonomy is to be regarded as a higher-level interest, of 
which privacy would constitute one species among potentially many others.23 On both 
readings, the injury to privacy constitutes ipso facto the injury to autonomy and the 
two need not be distinguished (indeed they should not, lest the same injury be counted 
twice).  
 What matters for the present purpose is to identify this head of detriment as 
separate from the previous one. This should not be controversial, for loss of privacy 
or autonomy is not – certainly not directly – a form of emotional disturbance. It is 
defined abstractly in terms of the loss of the ‘good’ represented by the protected 
interest, here privacy, not concretely in terms of the emotional disruption suffered by 
the claimant. While some difficulty in the relationship between the two might be 
immediately perceptible (and will be returned to in part II), this has to be our starting 
point: the two notions are clearly distinct in their self-understanding.  
 
5. ‘Loss of dignity’? 
It was argued at the outset that there were three types of relevant harms in privacy 
actions. The reason why a fourth heading on ‘loss of dignity’, a label that appeared in 
particular in Mosley24 and in Gulati,25 is nonetheless included here is that, whilst it 
does not in fact amount to a separate type of loss or detriment, this is not immediately 
apparent and therefore deserves separate treatment.  
                                                 
19 Gulati (n 5), [168]. 
20 Weller (n 16), [192]. 
21 Gulati (n 5), [108], [111], [168], building on Campbell (n 13), [50] and Mosley (n 1), [7]. 
22 This is transparent from the language used in the judgment, e.g. [168]: ‘the loss of privacy or 
autonomy as such’. 
23 This would seem to be the approach in Mosley: ‘The law now affords protection to information in 
respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy … That is because the law is concerned to 
prevent the violation of a citizen’s autonomy …’ (at [7]). The view that autonomy is an overarching 
principle underpinning most, if not all, other rights is a fairly common one, see e.g. Robert Stevens, 
Torts and Rights (OUP 2007) 339.  
24 Mosley (n 1) [216], [224]. 
25 Gulati (n 5), [141] (also, in combination with the words ‘damage’ or ‘affront’ rather than ‘loss’, 
[108] and [168]). At [108], ‘dignity’ is implicitly equated with ‘standing’. 
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 Analytically, there are three ways loss of dignity as harm can be interpreted, 
none of which makes it a distinct species. The first possibility is that it should be 
interpreted as being the loss of privacy, as already encountered, reframed at a higher 
level of generality (similarly to ‘loss of autonomy’). On that reading, privacy would 
be one dignitary interest among others; and saying that the claimant suffered a loss of 
his privacy and a loss of his dignity would be describing the same harm in two 
different ways, using either a specific or a more general term (like describing 
someone as ‘a Yorkshireman’ then ‘an Englishman’). The second possibility is that it 
would describe a concrete harm: ‘loss of dignity’ as ‘indignity’ in the non-legal sense 
of humiliation. Literally, to be humiliated is to be brought down to the ground 
(humus), that is to say, losing one’s status as an upright human being. On that 
alternative reading, loss of dignity would now count as a type of mental distress, as 
defined above. Finally, the third possibility is that it would be a combination of these 
two.  
 All three understandings can be seen to surface in the case law. Dangerous 
though it might be to read too closely judgments which did not mean to consider the 
question in any great detail, it would seem that Mosley leans towards the second 
interpretation26 and Gulati stands somewhere between the second and the third,27 
whereas Lord Hoffmann in Campbell appears to have had the first meaning in mind 
when he held that ‘private information [is] something worth protecting as an aspect of 
human autonomy and dignity’.28 Whichever is correct, what matters for the present 
purpose is that, one way or another, loss of dignity is reducible to other types of harm. 
It is neither necessary nor desirable to carve out a further category to accommodate it.  
 
6. Relationship 
The above survey identified, behind the various labels that courts (and scholars) might 
use, three – and only three – types of harm that can be redressed, at least in principle, 
in privacy actions: pecuniary loss, mental distress and loss of privacy. If we used a 
common dichotomy we would classify the first one as ‘pecuniary loss’ and the other 
two as ‘non-pecuniary losses’.29 But, besides being uninformative in that the second 
class is defined in a purely residual way, this would also suggest that these heads of 
detriment operate on the same level and can all be compensated if and when they 
arise: neither of which, as will be seen, is (or at least should be) true. Instead the 
distinction should be between, on the one hand, two concrete harms – the injury to the 
claimant’s wallet (pecuniary loss) and the injury to his emotional wellbeing (distress) 
– and, on the other hand, an abstract harm: the loss of privacy per se, i.e. considered 
in and by itself. How the relationship between these three heads of detriment should 
be understood in a principled way is a difficult question that will form the basis of the 
                                                 
26 This is implied in Eady J’s words, where three notions are reduced to two and then one, as if the 
various phrases were interchangeable: ‘damages for such an infringement may include distress, hurt 
feelings and loss of dignity. The scale of the distress and indignity in this case is difficult to 
comprehend. It is probably unprecedented. Apart from distress, there is another factor which probably 
has to be taken into account …’ (Mosley (n 1), [216], emphasis added). 
27 Gulati (n 5), [168]: ‘I have already found that the damages should compensate not merely for distress 
(still using that word as a shorthand, as described above), but should also compensate (if appropriate) 
for the loss of privacy or autonomy as such arising out the infringement by hacking (or other 
mechanism) as such. (This may include, if appropriate, a sum to compensate for damage to dignity or 
standing, so far as that is meaningful in this context and is not already within the distress element.)’ 
(emphasis added). 
28 Campbell (n 13), [50]. 
29 As e.g. in Tugendhat and Christie (n 9), ch. 13D.  
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next part. By way of preliminary, this final section simply examines the way courts 
have in fact articulated them, implicitly or explicitly. Pecuniary loss having, it seems, 
never been successfully claimed in a privacy action, this means looking at how the 
other two heads, distress and breach of privacy, are treated by courts.  
 Cases can be put on a spectrum in this respect. At one end would stand those 
judgments that were dealt with using the exclusive language of distress, i.e. with no 
suggestion being made that (absent economic loss) any other injury has been suffered 
by the claimant. Campbell is a case in point.30 At the other end of the spectrum one 
would place the action of the Weller twins, whose case was adjudicated without any 
reference to actual or potential emotional consequences that the taking and publishing 
of photographs of them might have caused, and who recovered substantial damages 
on the sole ground that their privacy had been invaded. In the middle are those 
judgments where not only both considerations (distress and breach of privacy) were 
present as part of the factual and legal background to the verdict, but damages were 
explicitly granted to redress both (whether ‘both’ means two separate injuries or one 
injury with two heads, which is immaterial for the present purpose). The case of the 
oldest Weller child, who was recognised to also have suffered ‘real embarrassment’31 
(besides the misuse of her own private information), and that of Max Mosley, are 
good examples. In the latter case it was held that, as well as compensating for the 
emotional consequences of the injury, damages should also ‘mark’ the infringement 
of the right to privacy,32 whatever exactly that might have meant.33  
 What a survey of relevant cases shows is that whether what we have here is 
one head of damages known under two names, or two separate heads which are 
always remedied, or two separate heads which may or may not be both redressed – 
whether or not through compensation – depending on the circumstances of the case, 
has to put it mildly no clear judicial answer. Perhaps the best illustration of the 
muddle, and constant to-ing and fro-ing, that courts have walked themselves into is 
provided by the key paragraph pertaining to quantum of damages in privacy actions in 
Gulati which, although a first instance judgment, is the leading case on the question to 
date. What made the case especially difficult (and interesting for the present purpose) 
was that the celebrity claimants whose phone had been hacked by News of the World 
remained unaware of it until the affair blew up and hence suffered no distress while 
the wrongs were being committed. Mann J, considering the basis on which the award 
of damages should be made, opined:  
 
the damages should compensate not merely for distress … but should also 
compensate (if appropriate) for the loss of privacy or autonomy as such arising 
out of the infringement ... (This may include, if appropriate, a sum to compensate 
for damage to dignity or standing, so far as that is meaningful in this context and 
is not already within the distress element.)34    
 
From this paragraph it would appear that we need to compensate distress but also loss 
of privacy per se if appropriate (what does that mean?); and that damages for loss of 
                                                 
30 Campbell (n 13), e.g. [33], [34], [75], [81], [98], [124], [130], [158], [168] [169]; cf, in the Court of 
Appeal ([2002] EWCA Civ 1373; [2003] QB 633), [55] and, in the High Court ([2002] EWHC 499; 
[2002] EMLR 30), [1]-[2] (‘Miss Naomi Campbell … seeks damages for breach of confidentiality … 
She claims that … she suffered distress, embarrassment and anxiety’), [141]. 
31 Weller (n 16), [196]. 
32 Mosley (n 1) [216]. 
33 On which see below, 21.  
34 Gulati (n 5), [168]. 
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privacy may (not ‘must’), if appropriate (ditto), include damages for loss of dignity, 
provided this has not already been compensated for under the first head (when would 
that be the case?). One could be forgiven for not understanding what the logic of the 
law is on these points, or doubting that there in fact such a logic that can be 
understood.  
 
II. Two analytical frameworks 
 
What the second part of this article seeks to argue is that the principal reason why the 
law struggles to understand the way these various harms, losses or detriments relate to 
one another is that it has been meandering, in the context of breach of privacy, 
between two analytical models of the law of torts which entail two very different 
understandings of the relationship between, on the one hand, the wrong that triggers a 
cause of action and, on the other hand, the harms or losses which damages seek to 
redress. (The existence of these two models and the competition between them are, as 
mentioned, not restricted to the law of privacy; but this tort does constitute the 
clearest battlefield between the two models and hence the best context in which to 
introduce and analyse the conflict.) Because the law is only dimly aware of the 
existence of these two opposing models and the way they clash, it has found itself 
unable to understand – and therefore to resolve – its own difficulties in terms of 
identifying and quantifying harms in privacy cases. 
 
1. The ‘bipolar’ model: wrong and ensuing loss(es) 
On the arch-dominant model on which English tort law35 operates, the wrong will be 
clearly contrasted with the losses36 that ensue. The wrong is the actualisation of real-
life events which give the claimant a tortious cause of action: in modern scholarship, 
this is typically described as a violation of – or injury to, encroachment upon – a right 
or, conversely, the breach of a duty owed to the claimant. The losses, on the other 
hand, are detriments which flow from the wrong and are therefore, by construction, 
distinct from it. The point might sound too obvious to be worth labouring, but it needs 
to be highlighted in anticipation of what follows: there is on the one hand the 
violation of a right and on the other hand the detriments that ensue. It is these 
detriments that money awards granted to the successful plaintiff seek to compensate. 
While the wrong naturally needs to be there, because it is what makes the ensuing 
losses wrongful (hence liable to be remedied), it is in itself transparent. The law does 
not seek to redress the wrong but to blot out, as far as money can do, its 
consequences. 
 In turn, these losses are typically thought of as being of two sorts: pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary, depending on whether they are directly valuable in money or, to 
put the same point in ordinary language, whether they leave the claimant ‘out of 
pocket’ or not. This is not controversial. Slightly more contentious, but important, is 
the idea that all non-pecuniary loss boils down, in the final analysis, to mental distress 
in the broad sense of the term (i.e. a disruption of the claimant’s emotional well-
being, irrespective of the specific label used by courts). The point was recognised in 
particular by Andrew Burrows, who argues that ‘ultimately all non-pecuniary loss is 
                                                 
35 Though not only English law: the rest of the common-law does not appear to be any different; indeed 
it dominates the civilian tradition as well.  
36 Because, as will be seen (below, 19), this model is wedded to a narrower, and uncontroversial, 
definition of loss, it is entirely appropriate to use the word – preferably to ‘harm’ – in this context.  
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concerned with the claimant’s distress or loss of happiness’.37 It is also implicit in the 
categorisation of non-pecuniary losses adopted by the leading English authority on the 
topic, McGregor on Damages, where the authors distinguish between four types of 
non-pecuniary losses, which can all be seen as forms of emotional disturbance: (i) 
‘physical inconvenience and discomfort’; (ii) ‘pain and suffering and loss of 
amenities’; (iii) ‘mental distress’ and (iv) ‘social discredit’.38 Accordingly we have on 
the one hand damage to the claimant’s wallet (his ‘having’) and on the other hand 
damage to his emotional tranquillity (his ‘being’).39 
 There is no need here to trace the genealogy of this model in any detail, but it 
can already be seen to operate in the Roman action on the lex Aquilia (the ancestor of 
the general principles of liability for harm caused by fault in modern civilian legal 
systems, which has also had a not inconsiderable influence on the English tort of 
negligence). The action, which visited certain types of damage to property, 
distinguished sharply between the tangible injury (corrumpere) caused to the thing 
(res) and the financial detriment that flowed from it (the damnum). The wrong was 
the causation of physical damage but the loss redressed by the law was the damnum, 
with this important consequence that if no loss ensued, no money award would be 
granted – a famous example being that of a castrated slave boy, whose value actually 
went up when he (in law, a res) was damaged.40  
 
2. The ‘unipolar’ model: wrong as loss 
While the above framework undoubtedly dominates the law, there exists another 
model of tort lurking in the background, clearly a minority position but making 
increasingly significant inroads into the modern law.41 On that model, the wrong and 
the loss – to use a terminology sometimes resorted to in that context, the iniuria and 
the damnum – collapse onto another, to the effect that the loss becomes the violation 
of the right. The detriment that the claimant has now suffered is that he has been 
wronged. Rights – typically thought of in that context as a list of protected interests, 
i.e. of ‘goods’ to which humans aspire, such as ‘liberty, physical integrity, land, 
                                                 
37 Andrew Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (3rd edn, OUP 2004), 31 
38 Harvey McGregor et al. (eds), McGregor on Damages (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) §5-003. 
‘Amenities’ means ‘pleasures’. By construction, we are not concerned here with any pecuniary 
consequences of these disturbances, which are being dealt with as part of pecuniary loss. 
39 Naturally both need not be present each time, either because they did not occur on the facts of the 
case or because the law does not recognize that one type of loss is recoverable when it flows from a 
given wrong or injury. 
40 D.9.2.27.28 (Ulpian, 18 Edict): ‘Further, if someone castrates your slave-boy and thus increases his 
value, Vivianus writes that the lex Aquilia should not apply, but that you should instead bring the 
action for insult or sue under the edict of the aediles for four times his value’ (tr. Watson Digest). 
41 This is not the place to speculate at length over the reasons. Two obvious factors that would have 
played a role are, on the one hand, the universally observable tendency of the law to redress more 
harms as it develops, especially harms of a non-tangible nature (which might not be readily 
accommodated under the requirement of loss in the usual sense of the term) and, on the other hand, the 
rise and rise of the language of rights in the common-law tradition over the last 20 years – in particular 
following the publication of Ernest Weinrib’s The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press) in 
1995 and, in the UK, the passing of the Human Rights Act in 1998. While the wedge drawn by people 
like Robert Stevens between rights-based and loss-based theories of tort is to my mind a false 
dichotomy, it is nonetheless easy to see how the terminology of rights leads directly to an idea of 
compensation, or redress, for the violation of the right itself, hence the use of such language as 
‘substitutive’ or ‘vindicatory’ damages.  
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possessions, reputation, wealth, privacy [and] dignity’ –42 form a sphere of protection 
around the plaintiff: as he gets physically injured, defamed or imprisoned, as his 
wealth is depleted, his chattels damaged or his privacy violated, he suffers a 
diminution of these ‘good things’. His interests have been invaded and that is the 
detriment, harm or loss that he has suffered. There is, on this model, not two levels of 
enquiry but one. The harm that the law redresses is not the noxious consequences of 
the wrong, it is the wrong (right-injury) itself. 
 Like the first one, this ‘unipolar’ model has an old pedigree. It can be traced 
back to the high scholastics, who understood harm as the taking away of what belongs 
to a person, his ‘goods’, whether the good – in modern parlance the protected right or 
interest – be in his chattels, his person, his dignity or the relationship he has with 
another person.43 Grotius’ definition of damnum, loss, in his Law of War and Peace 
(1625) captures the gist of that alternative model most concisely: he suffers a 
damnum, quis minus habet suo, i.e. ‘who has less than what is his’, that is to say, in 
this context, ‘less than his right’.44 The right that has been violated, encroached upon, 
abstracted, diminished, must be restored either in nature (hence such ideas as 
restoration of honour through forced apologies) or by equivalent.  
 Before we can return to the way these two models are going to play out in the 
context of breach of privacy, we need to explain how they relate to one another and 
also why they ought not to be combined. The latter point, in particular, is crucial to 
the argument developed in this paper.  
 
3. Connecting the two models 
These two models described as respectively bipolar and unipolar, because the former 
relies on two separate elements – the wrong (iniuria) and the loss (damnum) – 
whereas the latter conflates them, aim to explain the totality of the law of torts. They 
are two analytical frameworks aspiring to making sense of it as a whole. To use a 
simple analogy, they are like the imperial and the metric systems, which are both 
capable of accounting for any measurement in the physical world but operate on two 
parallel planes. These ought not to make contact lest units from the one are added to 
units from the other, resulting in nonsense. 
 When it comes to length, the conversion mechanism is simple: given e.g. any 
distance expressed in miles, dividing it by 1.609,344 will give us the equivalent in 
kilometres. The process is more complicated when it comes to the bipolar and 
unipolar models of tort, but a similar exercise of ‘conversion’ must be carried out to 
understand how each makes sense of the other.  
 
a) Conversion from the unipolar to the bipolar model is straightforward enough. The 
bipolar model accepts the existence of the wrong as a necessary requirement but, as 
was said, does not regard it as a compensable injury itself. It looks to the 
consequences of the wrong, not to the wrong itself, which is simply a peg that allows 
the subsequent losses to be wrongful and hence actionable. The underlying logic is 
that, once the (concrete) consequences of the wrong have been redressed, as far as 
                                                 
42 This is Tony Weir’s list: ‘There are several good things in life, such as liberty, physical integrity, 
land, possessions, reputation, wealth, privacy, dignity, perhaps even life itself. Lawyers call these 
goods “interests”.’: Tony Weir, A Casebook on Tort (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 6. 
43 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, II.II, Q. 61, art. 3; cf. James Gordley, The Jurists (OUP 2013) 
86. 
44 Hugo Grotius, De Iure Belli ac Pacis (Blaeu 1646) 2.17.2. 
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money allows, then the wrong itself has been blotted out in the eyes of the law and no 
further remedy does, indeed should, avail. 
 One logical consequence of this analysis is that, if losses of the relevant type 
(pecuniary loss or mental distress) are absent in the instance case, in that the wrong 
does not cause any such detriment,45 no compensatory damages will be granted. On 
this model either no action will lie at all, or a different remedy will avail (for instance 
nominal damages, which mean to recognise the existence of the wrong but deny, by 
definition, that any loss was caused).46 Indeed, one strong incentive to switch over to 
the alternative model would be the refusal to accept that logical consequence, i.e. the 
desire to grant substantial damages in situations where no loss in the above sense is 
present.47 
 
b) How to translate the bipolar model into the unipolar one is rather more complex, 
but it needs to be sketched out if we are to understand its logic (which, it must be 
emphasised, is dictated by the need to make sense of the law as it currently stands: it 
is an exercise in interpretation, not in devising an alternative system from first 
principles). The first step is to distinguish, among all the consequences of the right-
invasion, those which are described by the law as ‘consequential’ from those which 
are not. Consequential loss – almost always pecuniary, though it could in principle be 
of any sort – is loss that is one step removed from the wrong. This can be contrasted 
with ‘direct’ loss that flows immediately from it. Where the line is drawn is a 
complex question which has no authoritative answer, but it needs to be looked into in 
the present context. In most instances it will be clear-cut: for instance if you smash 
my car and as a result I have to spend £2,000 in repairs, that sum counts as direct loss: 
the need for repair is, of course, a consequence of the wrong, but it is not 
consequential loss in the technical, and narrower, sense of the term. On the other hand 
if, being a cab driver, I lose a further £5,000 in earnings while my car is immobilised, 
that additional loss counts as consequential loss.  
 If we leave aside for now those further losses, the way the unipolar model 
would re-interpret the consequentialist thinking of the dominant bipolar model would 
be by treating the direct ‘flowing’ loss as the flipside of the right-violation itself. In 
other words, by directly compensating for the diminution of the right, that is to say, 
by putting a monetary value on the amount by which it was reduced, the law 
indirectly compensates for these direct losses, both to the wallet and to feelings, 
whenever they are in fact present. Once the right has been compensated for, the direct 
consequences of its infringement are regarded as made up for and the claimant cannot 
additionally recover for them, which would amount to double recovery.48 In the above 
                                                 
45 A complication is that the law can analyse or value these harms differently. For instance, distress 
could be understood as the particular claimant’s actual distress or the distress that would be 
experienced by an ordinary claimant placed in the same circumstances.  
46 Conversely, of course, on the unipolar model any infringement of a right will warrant substantial 
compensatory damages for the harm represented by the wrong itself, irrespective of any (concrete) 
consequences. 
47 Below, 21. 
48 Aggravated damages complicate the picture but can be easily reconciled with that model on the 
understanding that the extra money award compensates for the additional distress caused by the 
defendant’s conduct, itself the flipside of the violation of another right of the claimant’s, which Birks 
called the right to a ‘proper share of respect’ and is violated when the defendant behaves towards the 
claimant in a hubristic way, denying him that right and causing him to feel humiliated (Peter Birks, 
‘Harassment and Hubris: The Right to an Equality of Respect’ (1997) 32 Irish Jurist (new series) 1, 
14). 
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example, the law would likely value the right-diminution at £2,000 (or a little more to 
take into account the associated distress, provided its availability is recognised in that 
context, which is not entirely clear as the law stands).  
 There remains non-direct, i.e. consequential, loss, for instance the £5,000 in 
the above scenario. Here, we know that as a matter of law these are recoverable 
according to general principles, in particular in terms of causation and remoteness, 
and so they can be claimed on that basis. However, on the logic of the unipolar model, 
the result is crying out for an explanation. If a loss is the violation of a right, the fact 
that further consequential loss suffered by the claimant is recoverable would seem to 
signify that it amounts to a separate wrong (i.e. the violation of another right). This 
cannot be explored further in the present context but it is interesting to note that this 
line of reasoning underpinned an important defamation judgment handed down by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa in 2011. In that case, Media 24,49 a taxi 
company sued a media defendant over defamatory incriminations they had published 
concerning the immoral and illegal behaviour of the claimant, seeking ‘general 
damages’ for the injury to its reputation and ‘special damages’ for the further 
economic loss (loss of profits) they had allegedly suffered as a result.  
 The Court held that they could recover in defamation (actio iniuriarum in a 
South African context) for their loss of reputation but, if they wanted to recover for 
the economic loss, they had to sue using a different cause of action (injurious 
falsehood which, in South African law, is regarded as part of the actio legis Aquiliae: 
a rough equivalent of the tort of negligence in England). Accordingly, in order to 
succeed, the claimant would need to establish the wrongful character of the economic 
loss according to the separate – and much more restrictive – rules of Aquilian 
liability/negligence. Although that point was hardly noted by the Court, the 
implication of this reasoning is that the economic loss is no longer to be regarded as 
consequential. It is now pure loss, corresponding to the violation by the defendant of 
the claimant’s interest in his wealth. Indeed, on the logic of the unipolar model, there 
is no such thing as consequential loss; each loss corresponds to a different injury, 
hence a different wrong, hence the violation of a different right.  
 
4. Mixing and matching 
From both systems’ ability – and, logically, their claim – to be an interpretative 
framework for all wrongs, it follows that (i) they ought not to be combined and (ii) it 
would, at best, be an unnecessary complication for the law to switch back and forth 
between them. This is the key point that needs to be accepted before we return to the 
application of these two models in the context of privacy claims.  
 On a principled level, adding, or moving between, secondary detriments 
recognised by the bipolar model (i.e. pecuniary loss and mental distress) and direct 
detriments on the unipolar one (any diminution of a right, for instance the loss of 
privacy) amounts to amalgamating objects which are ontologically different: events 
and their consequences, concrete losses and abstract losses. It is like adding apples 
and oranges or, to follow the previous metaphor, miles and kilometres. The flipside of 
this argument is that, practically, redressing both would amount to double recovery, 
that is to say, to counting the same injury twice: the first time as the diminution of a 
right, the second as the ensuing loss. Naturally there are all manner of complications 
to the argument, in particular because it depends on how right-diminutions are valued, 
                                                 
49 Media 24 v SA Taxi Securitisation (437/2010) [2011] ZASCA 117; 2011 (5) SA 329 (SCA); cf. Eric 
Descheemaeker, ‘Three Keys to Defamation: Media 24 in a Comparative Perspective’ (2013) 130 SALJ 
435, 439ff. 
 14 
and also on how systematically or not the law moves from one level of analysis to the 
other; but the gist of the argument, as the law currently operates, is straightforward 
enough and should not be difficult to accept. It can be illustrated with two examples, 
one from the ‘having’ side of the law (patrimonial loss) and the other from its ‘being’ 
side (mental distress). 
 On the having side, it is self-evident that, in the above example of the smashed 
car, if I recover £2,000 for the diminution of my property right, I cannot recover 
£2,000 again for the cost of repair: it would be redressing the same injury twice.50 
This is easy to see because, when it comes to pecuniary losses, they are directly 
valuable in money. On the other hand, in respect of non-pecuniary losses, which by 
definition are not directly so valuable, any award is bound to be arbitrary. This does 
not mean that they cannot be compensatory in a true sense of the term, nor that they 
are necessarily unfair or inconsistent, but it does make it very hard to prove that 
double recovery is at work. One good example to illustrate the issue can however be 
derived from the judicial Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages – i.e. 
damages for non-pecuniary harm or loss – in Personal Injury Cases. To take one 
example at random, they tell us that ‘complete loss of smell and taste’ should lead to 
an award ‘in the region of £28,750’.51 We know that the £28,750 are compensatory 
and we know that they do not compensate for any pecuniary loss, which is assessed 
separately; but what are they meant to compensate for? The dominant answer seems 
to be for mental distress (called ‘pain, suffering and loss of amenities’, or PSLA, in 
the context of personal injuries).52 This is consistent with the bipolar model: it is the 
emotional consequences of the wrong which are redressed. An alternative analysis, 
however, would be to regard them as compensating for the physical injury itself (as 
indeed suggested by the phrasing of the Guidelines): having lost his sense of taste and 
smell, the claimant now has less of his physical integrity than he once did. His right 
has been diminished and the award values this loss; by compensating for the wrong 
itself, the law ipso facto compensates for its emotional consequences. The important 
point, which this example should make reasonably easy to accept because the amount 
the claimant will receive has been stabilised, is that it cannot be both/and. If the 
claimant recovers £28,750 for his distress, he cannot get more (leaving aside, again, 
the complication of aggravated damages) for the very fact that he was injured – and 
vice-versa.53  
 
5. Application to breach of privacy 
We are now, finally, in a position to return to the particular cause of action under 
examination. As was said in the first part, there are three types of harm that are 
potentially redressable in privacy actions: pecuniary loss, mental distress and breach 
of privacy – all the other labels being reducible to one of these. To use an imperfect 
                                                 
50 Cf. Stevens (n 23) 59ff., in the context of the discussion of what he calls ‘substitutive damages’, a 
theory which – despite marked differences – has strong overtones of the unipolar model.  
51 Judicial College, Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases (12th 
edn, OUP 2013) 20.  
52 E.g. Guidelines (n 51) ix. This is an excellent example of presumed (indeed, deemed) distress.  
53 The alternative analysis does not appear to be followed in a pure way by any author, but a 
combination of both ways of thinking is not uncommon. For instance, Charlesworth & Percy on 
Negligence speaks of compensation for ‘the injury itself’, coming in addition to pain and suffering and 
loss of amenities as part of ‘non-pecuniary loss’ (C. T. Walton et al. (eds), Charlesworth & Percy on 
Negligence (13th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) §§5–93 - 5–94 (‘the injury by itself properly attracts an 
award of damages’)). On the purely bipolar model, on the other hand, the physical injury is in itself 
transparent; what matters is its consequences.  
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but helpful Latin terminology, we can call the first damnum, the second solatium 
(though solatium designates, in the later civilian tradition, the award granted ‘in 
solace for’ the suffering rather than the suffering per se) and the last iniuria (in the 
sense of the wrong itself). 
 If the argument that was developed in this part is correct the law can either, 
following the bipolar model, compensate for damnum and solatium – the iniuria being 
the peg, in itself transparent, on which the losses hang – OR it can, flipping over to the 
unipolar model, compensate for the iniuria and thereby, indirectly, compensate for all 
direct damnum and solatium.54 In that context the iniuria means the breach of privacy, 
which itself is the flipside of the loss of privacy. It is important to emphasise that loss 
of privacy is not a loss (or harm) that flows, like distress or pecuniary loss, from the 
breach of the claimant’s privacy: rather it is the breach itself – the diminution of the 
claimant’s privacy – looked at from a different angle. It is analytically there by virtue 
of the wrong of breach of privacy having been committed: saying that one has lost 
some of one’s privacy is the same thing as saying that one’s privacy has been 
encroached upon.  
 The key to the present argument is, as mentioned, that these are – or ought to 
be – alternatives. Because the two levels of analysis (the wrong and its consequences) 
both seek indirectly to redress the other one, all three types of harm should not be 
compensated at the same time. If damages for damnum and solatium are granted, the 
claimant will have received full redress for the wrong he suffered (the above example 
of physical injury being directly transferrable to breach of privacy). Conversely, if the 
law grants substantial compensatory damages for the loss of privacy then, on the logic 
of this alternative model, it must be regarded as having already compensated for all 
direct losses, both pecuniary and emotional – there only remaining consequential (i.e. 
further) loss, in the unusual cases where such loss does in fact occur.  
 
Response to an objection. One difficulty with this argument, and possibly the main 
reason why it might struggle to be accepted, especially by people who are solely 
interested in privacy (and perhaps closely related actions such as defamation, but are 
not tort lawyers generally) is that it would be entirely possible, in principle, to do 
things differently. The law could decide, in any successful action, to grant x by way of 
compensation for the breach itself – by reference not to its consequences but, perhaps, 
to its intrinsic gravity (or even a fixed sum) – and also y for the distress – assessed 
more or less objectively by reference to what an ordinary claimant would have felt 
like – in addition to z for any pecuniary loss if and when it arises. It would be possible 
to give one award for the breach per se and another award for its consequences, 
pecuniary or emotional. This would indeed appear to be the basis on which two 
Weller children got substantial damages for the wrong suffered, despite their 
complete unawareness that their privacy had been breached, while the eldest child got 
more because she also suffered distress.55  
 This would be far from absurd on a principled level, but it would run against 
hundreds of years of legal development. The rest of the law of tort does not grant, nor 
has it ever granted, damages for the abstract wrong and additionally damages for its 
                                                 
54 There would remain, as explained, non-direct (consequential) loss, but given that this is virtually 
bound to be economic loss – though one could, for instance, imagine a situation where the claimant 
became sick as a result of the breach of his privacy – and that, as explained, genuinely consequential 
economic loss is a rare (if at all existing) scenario in privacy cases, these losses can for all intents and 
purposes be ignored in the present discussion.  
55 Weller (n 16), [196]-[197].  
 16 
concrete consequences. As was seen, the dominant model by far is to grant damages 
for the latter and consider that these indirectly blot out the wrong itself. Indeed, 
combining compensation for the wrong and for its consequences would not even be 
compatible with the rest of the law of privacy. For, on that logic, all claimants should 
get an award for the loss of their privacy, independently of – and on top of – any 
redress for distress, given that they have by definition suffered it. But even a cursory 
glance at the case law shows that this is not the case.56 Regardless of its intrinsic 
merits (or lack thereof), the ‘both/and’ approach is incompatible with the existing law 
as it has developed over hundreds of years. The law of privacy should not tolerate the 
coexistence of incompatible models within its own midst, nor should it be allowed to 
harbour logics which throw the rest of the law into disarray.  
 
III. Four consequences 
 
Two important questions have been left almost entirely unaddressed so far: first, 
which model should the law of privacy adopt; second, what difference does it make 
which one we opt for? The first question would necessitate a separate treatment 
examining the entirety of tort law and accordingly will not be explored further in the 
present context, except insofar as it obliquely relates to the second. In this part, we 
look at four issues which are dependent on the choice made between the two models. 
On all four of these it will be argued that the unipolar model achieves results that are 
more satisfactory, which gives us at least some reasons to favour it. Yet the starting 
point has to be that, in most circumstances, the two models would reach the same 
results, because they are two ways of approaching the same injuries from different 
perspectives – both trying to do indirectly what the other does directly, namely, 
redress wrongs and compensate ensuing concrete losses. It is only in circumstances 
where a clear discrepancy arises between the wrong and the losses that flow from it 
that they will come to a head. However, if we accept that the law of privacy ought not 
to follow a micro-rationality of its own, apart from the mainstream of tort, the 
theoretical significance of choices that need to be made in our particular context is 
considerable, committing the law of civil wrongs as a whole (if not beyond).  
 
1. The privacy of juridical persons 
The first issue on which the choice between the bipolar and unipolar model would 
have a clear bearing is the question whether juridical (or ‘juristic’, ‘legal’, ‘artificial’) 
persons have a right to privacy, a question which continues to vex the law in a number 
of jurisdictions. While the link between the two is not mechanical, it is nonetheless 
very strong.  
 If we accept that non-physical persons are by construction incapable of 
experiencing emotions, it immediately becomes, given the centrality of damages for 
mental distress on the bipolar model, very difficult to understand how companies, 
                                                 
56 There is one further difficulty which cuts across the previous ones. It is that the law could consider 
‘emotional wellbeing’ as a separate protected interest standing level with the others. In that case, the 
same set of facts causing a breach of privacy and distress to the claimant would amount to the 
diminution of two rights hence two wrongs: the wrong of breach of privacy and the wrong of 
unlawfully causing distress (in which case, any damage for distress should be cut off from the law of 
privacy, or indeed any other cause of action, so as to avoid double-counting). Again it is conceivable 
but it is simply not the way the law works, save perhaps in exceptional, and therefore anomalous, 
circumstances. Happiness is not regarded as a protected interest in itself (which is why distress does 
not amount to sufficient damage for the purpose of the tort of negligence); rather it is parasitic on all 
other protected interests.  
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associations, partnerships and the like might enjoy a right to privacy. The argument 
against it would be that natural persons are granted such a right because they 
(ordinarily) suffer distress when their privacy is violated; because juridical persons 
are not susceptible to upset, it is at best not apposite – and at worst nonsensical – to 
grant them a right to privacy. This is indeed the basis on which a number of 
authorities have explicitly denied the existence of privacy rights for non-natural 
persons.57 
 Admittedly the conclusion does not follow as a matter of analytical necessity. 
There are at least two ways the above argument could be circumvented, even while 
accepting the need for noxious consequences before an action is granted. First, by 
arguing that legal persons do in fact have feelings. This is not as evidently absurd as 
might first appear: if legal persons are held capable – through the ordinary rules of 
attribution – of signing a contract, willing an act, being in good or bad faith, and 
committing torts and crimes personally, it is not entirely evident why they cannot 
equally be attributed emotions. The second counter-argument is that, while juristic 
persons cannot be wounded in their feelings, they can evidently be injured in their 
wallet, and the right to privacy is meant to protect the latter as well as the former.58 
This is an argument that is very commonly run in the context of defamation (in which, 
despite some significant exceptions, the law is by and large happy to assimilate legal 
to natural persons).  
 However both counter-arguments are weak. The attribution of feelings to 
juridical persons would be a novel idea; adopting it solely in that context in order to 
recognise a right to privacy for non-natural persons would likely come across as 
desperate. If the idea of attributed feelings was to be pursued, this should be done in a 
principled and systematic way. As to the protection of economic interests, the obvious 
rebuttal is that, if the primary aim of the right (as opposed to an incidental effect) is to 
protect against financial losses, breach of privacy is the wrong cause of action to use; 
and pressing it into service for that purpose would be an abuse of the tort –59 not to 
mention that, as was explained, many economic losses that we might want to describe 
as consequential upon breach of privacy are not in fact consequential at all.60 This 
parallels the argument frequently made in the context of defamation that legal persons 
                                                 
57 See, in England, R v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex p BBC [2001] QB 885, [48], [49]: ‘I 
do not see how [privacy] can apply to an impersonal corporate body, which has no sensitivities to 
wound’; ‘an artificial “person”, having no sensibilities, cannot be made to suffer [emotional distress]’ 
(Lord Mustill – note however that His Lordship was thinking of a form of territorial privacy for which 
there is a stronger argument to be made that it requires a corpus on the plaintiff’s part); in Australia, 
ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63, 208 CLR 199, [128]: ‘of necessity, this artificial 
legal person lacks the sensibilities … which provide a staple value for any developing law of privacy’; 
cf., in an American context, Robert Sack, Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander and Related Problems 
(PLI 2010), 12.3.5 : ‘Unlike actions for defamation, suits for invasion of privacy can be brought only 
by individuals. Neither corporations, associations nor partnerships have “feelings” … and they 
therefore may not recover damages … for such injury’. 
58 See e.g., in a New Jersey context, NOC Inc v Schaefer (1984) 484 A 2d 729, 731: ‘While a 
corporation may have its reputation or business damaged as a result of intrusive activity, it is not 
capable of emotional suffering’ (cited in Lenah (n 57), [127]). This is probably also what is meant by 
commentators who argue that privacy is, for non-natural persons, a means to an and rather than an end 
in itself: ‘A corporation does not want privacy for its own sake. Privacy to a corporation is only an 
intermediate good’: Anthony D’Amato, ‘Comment: Professor Posner’s Lecture on Privacy’ (1978) 12 
Georgia LR 497, 500 (idem). 
59 I have argued more fully in a different context that the ‘patrimony defence’ of personality rights for 
non-corporeal persons, i.e. the idea that they ought to be endowed with a personality because they can 
suffer in their pocket, is profoundly misguided: Descheemaeker (n 49) 445-6. 
60 Above, 3.  
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should sue in injurious falsehood (or negligence) if they want to protect their 
economic interests, not by towing them to an artificial cause of action for injury to 
their reputation. Therefore the bipolar model makes it, if not absolutely impossible, at 
least very difficult and strained to accept that a juridical person might have a right to 
privacy.  
 On the other hand, on the unipolar model, it becomes a very natural 
conclusion. Again, one must be careful because the link is not one of necessity, but 
the correlation is very strong. Once one has escaped the fetters of consequentialist 
thinking, the only question becomes whether juridical persons are capable of holding 
a right to privacy and, if so, whether it is a good idea to grant it to them. On the first 
limb, it is very hard to deny that they can. The ability to hold rights is typically 
regarded as the keystone of personhood-at-law; and (contrary for instance to corpus, 
i.e. physical integrity) there is nothing definitionally impossible with a privacy right 
for non-natural persons. That they also have an interest in controlling the flow of 
information about themselves, in the sense that it is a good to which they might 
aspire, is equally self-evident. Of course one could insist that privacy is properly an 
attribute of corporeality (or humanity), and therefore that legal persons should not be 
possessed with such a right, but this argument starts looking remarkably like one is 
not taking seriously the notion of a juristic person.61  Following this line of thinking, 
legal persons would probably be denied all the rights that we typically describe as 
‘personality rights’ (reputation, privacy, liberty, dignity, autonomy and the like) and 
be confined to property rights. This would fly directly in the face of what it means to 
be a person in the eyes of the law. Accordingly the unipolar model leads very 
naturally to the idea that legal persons do have a right to privacy (at least of the 
informational sort). At the very least it puts the onus on those who deny it to provide 
arguments why a person-at-law should not have a right of personality when there is 
no logical impossibility to it.    
 De lege lata, the issue has proved highly controversial and it is not difficult to 
attribute the unsettled character of the law to the underlying – yet unidentified – 
conflict between the two rationalities sketched out in the previous part, each pulling in 
the opposite direction to the other. South Africa has accepted that, in principle, all 
non-natural persons do have such a right.62  In the United States, on the other hand,  
the right has for the most part been denied.63 While not determinative, judicial 
pronouncements have been very largely negative in Australia64 and in England,65 even 
                                                 
61 This is in fact visible in the use of inverted commas in Lord Mustill’s quote above (n 57). This article 
is not the place to argue fully, on a normative basis, for the privacy of non-natural persons: interested 
readers can be referred e.g. to Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Bodley Head 1970) 42-51.  
62 Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd [1993] ZASCA 3, 1993 (2) SA 451 (A), 460G-461H 
(Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, reasoning by analogy from the right to reputation which 
itself has been recognized as an attribute of legal persons in a South African context, albeit with very 
little theoretical discussion). 
63 On the basis of absence of feelings: see Sack on Defamation (n 57) 12.3.5, cited above; cf United 
States Restatement Second, Torts, §652I (‘an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by 
a living individual whose privacy is invaded’). There is however a (small) strand of ‘dissenting’ 
opinions: see Lee Bygrave, ‘A right to privacy for corporations? Lenah in an international context’ 
(2001) 8 Privacy Law & Policy Reporter, 130, 133 n 39 and references cited.   
64 Lenah (n 57), esp [43] (Gleeson CJ grounding privacy in ‘human dignity’, which ‘may be 
incongruous when applied to a corporation’), [116], [126] (legal persons lack ‘sensibilities’), [132].  
65 The position is explained clearly in Tugendhat and Christie (n 9), §§8.72-8.76 (including the 
complication brought in by ex p BBC (above n 57), which concerned a claim for breach of a statutory 
duty not common-law privacy) and need not be repeated here. The main reason for Lord Mustill’s 
reluctance in that case to recognize the privacy of non-natural persons was, again, that privacy is an 
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though it is possible that English law might turn out to be constrained by the 
European Convention on Human Rights to protect at least that segment of the privacy 
right which concerns a juridical person’s right to respect for its correspondence and 
freedom from intrusion onto its premises (‘domicile’ in the French text, which has a 
wider scope than ‘home’ in English).66  
 
2. The privacy of non-sentient natural persons 
The very same reasoning applies to natural persons who are incapable of being 
distressed by the misuse of private information about them. The class may be defined 
more or less broadly depending on whether one insists that they should be distressed 
(or capable of distress) at the time when the wrong is committed or not, but at the 
very least it would include physical persons in a permanent coma or, as suggested in 
Gulati, claimants who died before discovering the covert invasion of privacy they had 
been subjected to.67 It is likely also to include children who are too young to care, at 
least at the time when the action is brought on their behalf.68 On the dominant bipolar 
model it is, for the same reasons as above, all but impossible to see how they could 
recover. On the other hand, on a unipolar model, these persons should be able to 
recover as a matter of principle, irrespective of any associated upset. If one believes 
that this is the right outcome, it becomes in turn a strong argument for the superiority 
of that model.  
 
3. The meaning of loss in privacy actions 
The third issue the choice of model has a direct bearing on is the meaning of loss in 
privacy actions. It should have already become apparent that many of the arguments 
or difficulties expounded above find their source in the fact that there exists different 
ways of construing compensable detriments in the context of privacy actions. The 
issue must now be examined in closer detail. However, for reasons already stated, this 
cannot be done without stepping back and examining the law of tort as a whole: 
whatever loss means, it should not be allowed to bear one meaning in a given context 
and something incompatible in a different context.  
 Despite the complexity of the details, it seems to me that the big picture of 
what tort law means by loss is in fact remarkably simple. Examining the substrata of 
English law (both past and present), we can discern three – and no more than three – 
understandings of the concept, which operate in concentric circles and can be related 
straightforwardly enough to the analytical models sketched out in the previous part. 
                                                                                                                                           
‘essentially human and personal concept’ (at [49]). In an interesting echo of Roman iniuria, he linked 
that idea to that of ‘the insult done to the person as a person’ which the breach of privacy represents 
(ibid).  
66 Tugendhat and Christie (n 9), §§8.77-8.78. However, the authors are very quick to dismiss the 
significance of the ECtHR’s case-law beyond these specific circumstances. Logically, if the Court 
recognizes that juridical persons enjoy any (sub-)type of privacy interest, English law would have no 
choice but to accept that these can have a right to privacy – even if a different and narrower one – if it 
is to remain Convention-compliant (unless this is held to come within the Member States margin of 
appreciation).  
67 Gulati (n 5), §136. 
68 As in the case of the Weller twins (above, 7) or young David Murray, the son of author Joanne 
Murray (better known as J. K. Rowling). It is however noticeable that the court in Murray reintroduced 
the idea of distress when it suggested that the reason why the parents of a young child who had not 
suffered distress at any point between the wrong and the judgment should be able to bring an action on 
his behalf was to protect his ‘freedom … to live normal lives without the constant fear of media 
intrusion’ (Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481, [50]): a form of 
pre-emptive protection against future distress.   
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 The first, narrowest, circle would be loss in the Roman sense of damnum, that 
is to say, financial or pecuniary loss: loss that is directly valuable in money or, to put 
the same point differently, that leaves the claimant ‘out of pocket’. While no-one 
would probably want to argue today that, as a matter of principle, loss is restricted to 
damnum to the exclusion of anything else, this idea can in fact be seen to resurface 
time and again in modern discussions: the law has never quite got over the idea that 
loss that is not to the pocket is not real or proper loss.69 The second circle, which is 
clearly the dominant paradigm, is to regard a loss as a concrete detriment suffered by 
the claimant: in Robert Stevens’ words, the situation of being ‘factually worse off’.70 
This is not easy to pin down with words – in particular, it is not the same as tangible 
injury – but it is not difficult to grasp intuitively. On that reading, both pecuniary 
losses and the sort of harms that were described in part I as non-pecuniary losses 
(which, it was argued, boil down to mental distress) count as loss. They make the 
claimant worse off in a concrete way. But this definition falls short of including losses 
sometimes described as ‘abstract’, ‘legal’ or ‘normative’, that is to say, harms which 
do not leave the defendant worse off either financially or emotionally and only are 
losses because the law says so.71 Loss of use, loss of autonomy, loss of liberty and the 
like, considered in and by themselves (i.e. independently of any noxious 
consequences which may or may not actualise), are examples of ‘non-concrete’ losses 
which are excluded on the intermediary – and dominant – understanding of loss. The 
third concentric circle, on the other hand, includes these abstract losses as well as the 
concrete ones. On that model, every violation (or diminution) of a right – i.e. every 
wrongful interference with a protected interest – counts as a loss, irrespective of its  
financial or emotional consequences on the claimant. To follow Tony Weir’s above 
taxonomy,72 losses consist in the diminution of – encroachments on the rights to – 
‘liberty, physical integrity, land, possessions, reputation, wealth, privacy, dignity’ and 
any other ‘goods’ that the law might recognise and protect against at least a range of 
interferences. 
 From the above characterisation, it can easily be seen that the two analytical 
frameworks outlined earlier to understand the relationship between wrong and loss are 
tied to two different understandings of ‘loss’ which correspond to two different 
constructions of what compensable detriments in privacy actions are. The bipolar 
model, which counts as losses damnum and loss of happiness, is predicated on the 
intermediary definition of loss as being factually worse-off: the two are the flipside 
one of the other and it is therefore entirely unsurprising that they should have risen to 
prominence together. On that reading, the losses privacy concerns itself with are, like 
any other cause of action, financial loss and mental distress. The unipolar model, on 
the other hand, is wedded to the widest definition of loss as being a ‘right-
diminution’: as was explained, it conflates the loss with the wrong, that is to say, with 
the encroachment upon the right – in our context, the right to privacy. On that 
conceptualisation, the loss or harm suffered by the claimant in a privacy action is loss 
                                                 
69 One example of this line of thinking among many others: ‘Mental distress is a harm, but to say that it 
is a “loss” courts the danger of its being understood as a compensable pecuniary detriment; and the fact 
that it is not then begins to suggest that it is not the proper subject of any award at all’: Birks (n 48) 30. 
70 Stevens (n 23) 59: ‘although loss is not limited to financial loss, in principle it requires proof that the 
claimant was factually worse off as a result of the infringement of the right’; also p. 78: ‘“Loss” has 
been used in the sense of being factually worse off’. 
71 This is different from saying that they only are actionable losses because the law says do, which is of 
course invariably true. 
72 Above, n 42. 
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of privacy and, consequential losses apart, nothing but it – ordinary distress and direct 
pecuniary loss being subsumed under it.  
 The two models being grounded in two conflicting logics, the choice made on 
one level pre-empts the choice made on the other: what one cannot have is a unipolar 
model with the intermediate meaning of loss (which would be a contradiction in 
terms) or the bipolar model with the widest understanding of loss (which would 
amount to treating the same loss – here loss of privacy – both as the wrong itself and a 
consequence of the wrong: a contradiction in terms).  
 
4. Compensating and vindicating the right to privacy 
The final point to be examined concerns the relationship between compensatory and 
so-called ‘vindicatory’ money awards in the law of privacy. The argument flows 
logically from the previous section and, again, the law of privacy must be examined 
here in the broader context of tort law. 
 As can easily be seen, on the narrower of the two main understandings of loss 
sketched out above (i.e. the middle one, of loss as factual worse-offness), there will 
by construction be detriments or harms that cannot be called losses. They are those 
losses included in the widest definition, but excluded by the intermediary one, which 
we described as abstract, legal or normative losses: for example, in our instant case, 
the loss of privacy considered per se. If they are not losses, by definition they cannot 
be compensated.73 From this a simple alternative follows, with three branches. The 
law can either (i) deny redress altogether on the basis that there is no ground for the 
law to intervene, as the Roman lex Aquilia did with the castrated slave-boy;74 (ii) 
grant nominal damages to mark the right-infringement sans loss; or (iii) grant 
substantial damages anyway. The second branch has historically been the response of 
the common law in situations of wrong without loss (in the factual worse-offness 
sense of the term). What is of interest to us in the present context is the third one. As 
is well known, English law has increasingly come to recognise a class of substantial 
damages in situations where a wrong has been suffered but, on the usual 
understanding of the term, no loss suffered. The term ‘vindicatory damages’ has now 
established itself to designate this sort of award. Why the law would want to 
recognise such an (at least apparently) novel category and how it relates to existing 
categories are difficult questions which have already caused a lot of ink to spill. In 
particular, it has been remarked that all money damages in tort have a vindicatory 
function, in the sense of affirming judicially the existence of the claimant’s right and 
the need to respect it,–75 which makes it peculiar to use the term to designate a 
narrow, and largely residual, type of monetary awards. But this discussion belongs 
elsewhere.  
 The one point worth mentioning here is that, while the concept of vindicatory 
damages (in the sense of substantial damages which are meant neither to compensate 
the plaintiff for a loss nor make the defendant disgorge a gain or punish him for some 
wrongdoing) is required under the intermediary meaning of loss – itself tied to the 
bipolar model – so as to step into the breach opened by the exclusion of non-‘lossful’ 
                                                 
73 I treat it as an apodictic proposition that compensation is for losses and losses only. This does not 
appear to be doubted by anyone.  
74 Above, 10. 
75 E.g. Normann Witzleb and Robyn Carroll, ‘The role of vindication in tort damages’ (2009) 17 Tort L 
Rev 16, 16: ‘The award of every judicial remedy, whether in the nature of declaration, coercion, 
compensation, restitution or punishment, can be said, in general terms, to vindicate the legal rights of 
the plaintiff’. 
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detriments from the ambit of compensatory awards, it becomes redundant under the 
widest meaning of loss and the unipolar model that is wedded to it. For, if loss of 
privacy – or liberty or any other interest in the context of which the label might be 
used – is a proper loss, it follows that it can – indeed it should – be compensated with 
proper – i.e. substantial – money damages.76 On the other hand, if courts refuse to 
characterise it as loss but still want to award more than nominal damages, then they 
need to come up with an alternative label and an alternative logic.77  
 Within privacy, the concept of vindication-apart-from-compensation was 
touched upon, if with a level of ambiguity, by the High Court in Mosley, when Eady J 
opined that, when it came to assessing quantum of damages, ‘[a]part from distress’ 
there was ‘another factor which probably has to be taken into account … that of 
vindication to mark the infringement of a right … to mark the fact that … a[n] 
individual has taken away or undermined the right of another – in this case taken 
away a person’s dignity’.78 However, in the wake of Weller79 and Gulati80 (which 
themselves followed on the important judgment of the Supreme Court in Lumba),81 it 
would appear that vindicatory damages are, as a matter of principle, no longer 
available in breach of privacy actions. This has very significant implications for our 
debate. Since the view that breaches of privacy which do not cause either distress or 
pecuniary loss are no longer actionable, or only sound in nominal damages, would be 
blatantly inconsistent with these two decisions, it would seem that the only option left 
to us is to accept that substantial compensatory damages are available for loss of 
privacy per se. Having removed the safety valve of vindicatory damages, which 
allowed it to maintain ambiguity concerning what harms it actually compensates, the 
law would have no choice but to switch to the widest meaning of loss and therefore to 
the unipolar model. This seems to have been recognised by Mann J in Gulati, when he 
held that ‘[d]amages awarded to reflect the infringement are not vindicatory in the 
sense of Lumba. They are truly compensatory’.82 
 It is difficult not to recognise the superior logic of this alternative model, 
which can be broken down in four limbs: (i) loss of privacy is, in itself, a real loss; (ii) 
it is a real loss because privacy is a real ‘good’; indeed this is the reason why the law 
grants it protection in the first place; (iii) if it is a real loss then it can be redressed 
with real, i.e. substantial (not nominal) compensatory (not vindicatory) damages; (iv) 
the compensation of the loss indirectly operates, as per the usual principles, as 
vindication of the right infringed.83 Yet, this pristine logic stands at odds with the rest 
                                                 
76 Of course the amount awarded is arbitrary but that is true of all losses which do not leave the 
claimant out of pocket.  
77 It is tempting to go one step further and argue that the current explanation is precarious – being 
massively over-inclusive – precisely because it originates in an unworkable attempt to redress 
violations of right per se while retaining a narrower, and incompatible, understanding of loss grounded 
in the old bipolar model.   
78 Mosley (n 1), [216]. He however added, puzzlingly, that ‘[i]f other factors mean that significant 
damages are to be awarded, in any event, the element of vindication does not need to be reflected in an 
even higher award’. This seems to be a way of straddling the two models by saying that substantial-
damages-as-vindication are a fall-back option to be resorted to when substantial-damages-as-
compensation collapse because of the narrower meaning of loss used by courts. If this was true, 
however, it would destroy the meaningfulness of the concept of loss. 
79 Weller (n 16), [190]. 
80 Gulati (n 5), [128]. 
81 R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 AC 245. 
82 Gulati (n 5), [132]. 
83 ‘[T]he vindication is effected through compensation’: Witzleb and Carroll (n 75) 22. 
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of tort law, which as was seen follows, by and large, a different model. Accepting it in 
the particular context of breach of privacy would therefore have a massive rippling 
effect on the rest of the law, it being well nigh impossible (as well as undesirable) for 
privacy actions to follow a separate logic of their own.  
 
Conclusion  
This  article has sought to identify and order the harms or losses which the law might 
redress in actions for breach of privacy. This entailed straddling an uneasy divide 
between, on the one hand, a close examination of privacy cases and, on the other, 
much broader issues of private law theory. The existence of two theoretical models of 
tort law, coming with two different ways of understanding the relationship between 
wrong and harm, or loss, was identified and applied to the context of privacy actions, 
which constitutes perhaps the clearest battlefield between the two models. It was 
argued that on one model, the wrong is in itself transparent and what the law seeks to 
compensate are the detriments that flow from it, which are themselves either to the 
pocket (pecuniary loss) or to the feelings (mental distress). On the other model, the 
harm conflates with the wrong and it is the diminution of the right itself which is 
compensated, even though the noxious consequences will factor into the valuation of 
the injury – and, for that reason, direct losses should not be compensated as well lest 
double recovery should occur. Because these models are alternative, and 
incompatible, ways of understanding the whole of tort law, courts should neither 
combine them nor switch back and forth between them. In the context of privacy, the 
implication is that the three heads of detriment recognised by the law and which were 
identified in the first part – namely, pecuniary loss, mental distress broadly construed 
and loss of privacy – ought not to be combined. The law should aim to compensate 
either the first two or the last, these being two ways of approximating, from two 
opposite perspectives, the very same injury or injuries suffered by the claimant.  
 On a theoretical level, the choice we make between these two models – 
described as respectively ‘bipolar’ and ‘unipolar’ – has momentous consequences, in 
particular in terms of our understanding of the notion of loss and the role of 
vindicatory damages, first in the law of privacy and then, by a rippling effect, across 
the law of tort. The recent cases of Weller (2014) and Gulati (2015) – both of which 
are currently under appeal – are especially significant in this respect in that they 
appear to mark a clear switch away from the traditional consequentialist model of tort 
law and focus on the right-injury instead, thereby pressing into service the loss-as-
wrong model of tort. The practical implications are also highly significant, in 
particular when it comes to the availability of actions for breach of privacy to juridical 
persons and natural persons who have not been affected emotionally by the wrong. In 
the background to this apparently technical debate stand fundamental, and highly 
value-laden, questions about the nature of personhood and what it means for a person 
to be the holder of rights.  
 
 
